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This paper analyzes how states have negotiated, distributed, and contested responsibili-
ties within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
It applies the English School (ES) theory and argues that climate responsibility constitutes 
an emerging primary institution of international society. Due to its rising great power sta-
tus, China plays an increasingly important role in social processes in which international 
society defines and distributes states’ responsibilities, especially those of the great powers, 
now and in the future. Therefore, this paper pays particular attention to China’s contribution 
to the UNFCCC. Ultimately, the paper offers ES empirical observations about the relationship 
between primary and secondary institutions as well as the role of agency in institutional change.
Introduction
In this paper, I examine how states have negotiated, distributed, and contested responsibilities 
within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Based on my analysis 
of the generation and evolution of international practices of climate responsibility within the 
UNFCCC, I argue that climate responsibility is an emerging primary institution of international 
society. Ultimately, I aim to contribute to the English School (ES) via empirical observations 
about the relationship between primary and secondary institutions as well as the role of agency 
in institutional change. 
Hence, I set two objectives for this paper: First, I aim to provide the ES with empirical 
observations, which are needed “if an institutional project à la ES is to get off the ground” 
(Wilson 2012, 577) by examining the emergence of a new primary institution of international 
society, namely, climate responsibility. Second, I develop Tonny Brems Knudsen’s (2013) 
“pre-theory of fundamental institutional change” by bringing agency back to the discussions 
of institutions of international society within the ES. However, I deliberately focus on state 
agency, because states—and especially great powers—pursue definitions of international rules 
in a way that serves their (domestic) interests and values. In empirical terms, I focus on the role 
of China in international climate politics, because its role is crucial for the future of interna-
tional society in general and for climate responsibility in particular. China is the largest carbon 
emitter in the world. Due to its rising power status and the failure of the U.S. to shoulder its 
own share of climate responsibility under the Trump administration, China is also in a position 
to dictate how climate responsibility is defined, allocated, and implemented in the future. 
China’s rise has generated so-called China threat theories that speculate on the negative 
impacts of its growing global outreach. Although this article does not touch upon questions 
about whether or not China is a status quo power, it may provide useful suggestions about the 
ways in which it might transform practices of international society. 
The paper proceeds as follows: I begin with a brief introduction to debate over primary 
and secondary institutions within the ES and discuss the relevance of this distinction in state 
60      |     KOPRA
responsibility. Because the UNFCCC is the key secondary institution that bridges the gap 
between primary institutions and real life experience, I analyzed how states have debated and 
distributed responsibilities within it. I introduce the key events and tensions that have shaped the 
formation of climate responsibilities globally. Thus, I study international climate agreements 
in order to find out how responsibility is defined and distributed within the UNFCCC: Who is 
appointed to be responsible for what, when, and how? In this way, I offer a narrative of the 
evolution of the emerging primary institution of climate responsibility and analyze China’s 
contribution to the process. 
Institutions and Agency 
The basic premise of the ES is that states form an international society that is organized and 
sustained by common (primary) institutions (Bull 2002). According to Barry Buzan’s (2004, 
181) definition, these primary institutions are “durable and recognized patterns of shared 
practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, amd [sic] 
embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles.” Buzan’s definition is somewhat similar 
to Chris Reus-Smit’s (1999) fundamental institutions and Kal Holsti’s (2004) foundational 
institutions. Given the centrality of the notions of institutions within the ES, as Peter Wilson 
(2012, 568) pointed out, it is indeed very surprising how premature its agreement on the defi-
nitions, identity, and role of institutions remains. Many ES theorists have focused on the nature 
of international society and debated what institutions are constitutive for its maintenance (see, 
for example, Buzan 2004, 2014a; Holsti 2004; Schouenborg 2013, 2014; Wight 1999; Wilson 
2012). Most of these lists, however, do not provide any explicit criteria to define what makes 
something a primary institution. Nor do they pay attention to how those institutions transform. 
In fact, not even Hedley Bull has explained how he defined his five common institutions (bal-
ance of power, diplomacy, international law, great power management, and war) or why he 
excluded other institutions from his list (but see Buzan 2014a, 97–98; Schouenborg 2014, 
80–81). Wilson’s own solution to the debate on what counts as a primary institution is empir-
icism: “Until we [ES scholars] have data about what institutions exist internationally, our 
speculations about them will remain just that, speculations, and our taxonomies and theories 
about them will remain rootless, subjective and abstract” (Wilson 2012, 577). Wilson himself 
(2016, 114) suggested that ES scholars should analyze the “social assumptions, standards and 
expectations” of people, especially those of the political elites and study how they socially 
construct institutions. 
I propose that the literature of practices may illuminate what constitutes an institution in 
ES terms and shed light on how to recognize and study them empirically via historic materials. 
In fact, Cornelia Navari (2011, 620) noted that Bull’s concept of institution is identical to Theo-
dore R. Schatzki’s concept of integrative practice, which refers to the “more complex practices 
found in and constitutive of particular domains of social life” (Schatzki 1996, 98). In addition 
to practical understandings, they include “explicit rules, principles, precepts, and instructions,” 
and “teleoaffective structures comprising hierarchies of ends, tasks, projects, beliefs, emotions, 
moods, and the like” (Ibid., 99). These understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structures orga-
nize practices normatively (Ibid., 101–102). In addition, Charlotta Friedner Parrat’s (2014, 10) 
checklist is a very useful tool for an assessment of whether an international (climate) practice is 
so constitutive of international society that it comprises a new primary institution:
• Is the institution truly international, or can the same institution exist within a state?
• Is it a routinized practice based on ideas and does it include norms, rules, and etiquette?
• Is it consciously upheld by actors?
• Is it quite stable over time and does a critical mass of states endorse it?
• Is it co-constitutive of actors?
If the definition of the concept of a primary institution is not clear within the ES, neither is 
the concept of a secondary institution. Buzan (2004, 2014a) and Holsti (2004) emphasized the 
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regulative nature of secondary institutions and see them merely as empirical materializations 
of primary institutions. It would be tempting to define secondary institutions as concrete inter-
national organizations that are intentionally established pragmatic solutions to “real-world” 
problems. However, that definition would ignore international treaties and informal multilat-
eral institutions. For example, international climate governance is largely coordinated by the 
UNFCCC, a political framework treaty or a regime. Killian Spandler (2015, 607–08) noted 
that secondary institutions “include international organizations and regimes” and “specific 
rules” as well as “sets of discursively formulated expectations, but they are more specific [than 
primary institutions] in that they refer to temporally and spatially discrete sections of inter-
national reality and apply to a clearly defined set of actors” (Ibid., 613 emphasis in original). 
Friedner Parrat (2014, 10) developed Spandler’s conceptualization and defined secondary 
institutions as “specific rules, which, in principle, are institutionalized by states, within inter-
national organizations.” Her example of such a rule is the UN Security Council’s permanent 
members’ veto power. In the context of international climate politics, Common But Differenti-
ated Responsibilities (CBDR) could be a plausible candidate for such a rule. 
I define secondary institutions as “stable, goal-oriented bodies that are intentionally 
designed by international actors to manage and regulate common problems in specific prag-
matic issue areas and to govern cooperation through collectively settled norms and rules, 
whether legally codified or not” (Kopra 2018). They include regimes, international organiza-
tions, and international rules that have become established practices over time (cf. Keohane 
1989, 3–4). They not only provide material evidence of the existence of primary institu-
tions but also play a genuine role in institutional change (Knudsen 2013, 2016; Navari 2016; 
Spandler 2015; Friedner Parrat 2014). In particular, Knudsen (2013, 18) pointed out that inter-
national organizations are central to the “reproduction and working [of primary institutions], 
and therefore also to changes in their working.” His approach differs profoundly from that 
of Buzan (2004, 186), who contended that clashes amongst primary institutions are the “key 
driving force” for institutional change in international society. This means that despite the 
terminology, the relationship between primary and secondary institutions is not a one-way 
hierarchical relationship, because they both shape each other. Indeed, Knudsen (2013, 34) 
concludes that secondary institutions are the “most important frameworks for the reproduc-
tion and change of fundamental institutions, and thus for the maintenance and development of 
international order and justice.” Consequently, I assert that secondary institutions (and their 
constitutive documents in particular) are the most important venues for gathering empirical data 
on the institutions of modern international society, as well as for studying the role of agency in 
the history of international society (Kopra 2018). 
Despite its merits, Knudsen’s model cannot thoroughly understand and explain the evolu-
tion of international practices, because it does not pay explicit attention to the role of agency 
in institutional change. What makes secondary institutions special is that they create a social 
and political space in which individual actors can shape the workings of international society. 
Normally, the establishment of secondary institutions cannot be traced back to one single pri-
mary institution, but they reflect and operationalize many primary institutions simultaneously. 
As I have argued elsewhere, climate responsibility makes no exception; it cannot be located 
in one single secondary institution, but there are many international forums in which the par-
ticipants can discuss climate responsibility or at least some aspects of it. Yet there is a special 
secondary institution, namely the UNFCCC, that gathers state and non-state actors together 
and coordinates climate practices and makes them possible. Like other secondary institu-
tions, the UNFCCC functions as a bridge between an emerging primary institution of climate 
responsibility and everyday politics at the national level. On the one hand, it embeds primary 
institutions in the quotidian workings of international relations; on the other hand, it embod-
ies changes in the workings of the day-to-day international relations in primary institutions. 
Power shifts in international relations, as well as domestic happenings—such as the inauguration 
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of a head of state—that take place in powerful states may gradually shape the constitutive 
principles of primary institutions via secondary institutions. For example, if President Trump 
ignored the climate policies made by the Obama administration, it would probably not only 
transform the workings of the UNFCCC but also generate more profound change in inter-
national society. However, the UNFCCC has no intrinsic value as such. Instead, it provides 
states and non-state actors with a platform to negotiate the content, scope, and allocation of 
issue-specific general and special responsibilities and to monitor the fulfilment of international 
rights and responsibilities. In this way, it functions as a link between international society and 
world society. It offers non-state actors a forum to influence existing primary institutions, 
such as sovereignty, or to forward the emergence of new ones, as the cases of international 
environmental and human rights practices demonstrate. Again, these negotiations are shaped 
by primary institutions (Kopra 2018). 
Climate Change and Practices of International Society
When it comes to economics, the ES theory remains undeveloped, and there is “hardly any dis-
cussion” about potential economic primary institutions (Buzan 2014a, 136). For the purposes 
of this paper, it is adequate to examine how international practices that focus on economic 
growth have dictated international climate practices. I treat the market as a primary institution 
and view economic growth as one of the international practices it comprises. This is not to say 
that there were no economic practices before the emergence of free markets and capitalism, 
which brought with them the “growth fetish” of the late eighteenth century (cf. Holsti 2004, 
211–18). Although the market did not gain “something like fully global status as an institution 
of international society” before the end of the Cold War (Buzan 2014a, 138), it has undoubt-
edly been the most influential economic practice since the emergence of international climate 
practices (Newell and Paterson 2010, 11–35). Moreover, it has affected China’s climate practices 
from a very early stage, as China started to take steps toward red capitalism in 1978. No doubt, 
modern capitalism is “with increasingly few exceptions” and will continue to be the “operat-
ing system of the world economy” now and in the foreseeable future (Speth 2008, 7). Since 
Truman’s inauguration speech in 1949, development has been the key word of the capitalist era 
(Sachs 1993, 4). In particular, development has been largely understood as a synonym for economic 
growth, and its qualitative aspects are often dismissed. The well-being of humankind is usually 
measured in economic terms, such as gross domestic product (GDP), and governments tend 
to take economic growth as their ultimate responsibility. This approach clearly emphasizes 
material conditions over the social, environmental, and spiritual factors of well-being (Speth 
2008, 147). It has also legitimized highly technocratic ideas of nature and promoted policies 
based on cost-benefit calculations rather than on genuine value consideration. 
The Emergence of Climate Responsibility
When the UN was founded, environmental issues were not a major concern of international 
society. The UN Charter, for example, did not address the environment at all. The UN dis-
cussed environmental issues for the first time in 1968, and four years later, the UN Conference 
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) was held in Stockholm, Sweden. Although the UNCHE 
did not focus on climate change as such, it created most of the principles and rules of inter-
national environmental practices, which framed how climate change was later defined, what 
kind of responses were seen as appropriate, and how global responsibilities were allocated. 
Prior to the UNCHE, environmentalists began to express their concern over the clash between 
the system of sovereign nation-states and global environmental problems. However, govern-
ments were not eager to compromise on their sovereignty and national interests for the sake 
of environmental protection. Particularly, many developing countries had gained their inde-
pendence just shortly before the UNCHE, and for them, sovereignty was nonnegotiable. As 
a result, sovereignty served as a cornerstone of the definition of state environmental responsibil-
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ity. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that “States have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the UN and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies.” This right, however, is 
constrained by a state-centric no harm principle—the latter part of principle 21 declares that 
states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction” (UN 1972).
Maoist China played quite an important role at the UNCHE, which was the first ever 
UN conference it participated in. It made key contributions to paragraphs two, four, and five 
of the Stockholm Declaration (see Greenfield 1979; Sohn 1973). In particular, China made 
a substantial contribution to the establishment of the link between the environment and eco-
nomic development (with emphasis on the latter) and promulgated all governments’ general 
legal obligation to protect the environment. It also became a voluntary leader of developing 
countries by promoting the interests of all developing countries. Despite China’s active 
participation in the debate at the UNCHE, it did not sign the final agreement since it did not 
contain strong socialist statements.
When it comes to climate responsibility, scientists have been important “norm entrepre-
neurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896), and scientific consensus on climate change emerged 
during the 1970s and the 1980s (see Paterson 1996). The first World Climate Conference, to 
which China did not send a representative, was held in Geneva in 1979. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a series of non- and intergovernmental conferences focusing on the scientific and political 
dimensions of climate change were organized. Of these conferences, the Villach Conference in 
October 1985 is often applauded as the most influential, not because it would have represented 
a “significant change in scientific conclusions” about climate change but rather because these 
scientific conclusions started to translate into concerted demands for political actions (Franz 
1997, 2–3). Consequently, climate change transformed from being a scientific phenomenon to 
a political problem during the 1980s. This changed the framing of climate change—it became an 
object of hard political struggles over the significance of the problem, potential resolutions, 
and distribution of responsibility, etc. The debate was, and continues to be, an important factor 
for defining and allocating climate responsibilities amongst states: Do we categorize climate 
change as an economic, environmental, human security, or ethical problem? Do we focus on 
historical or contemporary greenhouse gas emissions? And do we place the responsibility on those 
who produce the most greenhouse gas emissions or to those whose consumption patterns 
cause the most emissions? 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) took place in Rio de Janeiro 
between 3rd and 14th of June 1992. As it was a massive, unprecedented event with representa-
tives from 172 states (of which 108 were state leaders), about 2,400 NGO representatives (plus 
17,000 participants in the parallel NGO forum) and about 10,000 on-site journalists, it is probably 
fair to say that the outcomes of the conference—Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity—represented universal 
agreement of all the states in the world. All the outcomes were characterized by the concept of 
sustainable development. The NGOs’ unusually extensive access to international negotiations 
resulted in their greater participation in other international forums as well (Porter, Brown, and 
Chasek 2000, 69).
From the perspective of climate responsibility, the most central outcome of the UNCED 
was the UNFCCC. The purpose of the UNFCCC was to establish a legal framework that 
holds certain parties liable for climate-related harm and hence formulates effective solutions to 
tackle climate change. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve the “stabilization 
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of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UN 1992). What dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference means is inevitably a scientific, ethical, and political question, which 
was left unresolved at the Rio Conference. The UNFCCC acknowledged that “change in the 
Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind.” Although devel-
oping countries were not very comfortable about accepting “common responsibility” (Porras 
1993, 28), the UNFCCC assigned general responsibilities to all the parties of the convention. 
First, all of the parties have a solidarist, intergenerational responsibility to “protect the climate 
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind.” They also have a 
responsibility to cooperate, because “the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate 
international response.” Moreover, all states have a general responsibility to “take precaution-
ary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate 
its adverse effects.” This general responsibility is, however, limited by and puts flesh on the 
bones of the principle of CBDR. States must also provide information. For instance, they have to 
compile and publish national inventories of anthropocentric greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
by sources and removals of sinks. In addition, they must develop national climate programs 
and cooperate in the fields of science, education, training, etc. in order to improve capaci-
ties to mitigate and adapt to climate change around the world. The UNFCCC views sustainable 
development as both a right and responsibility of states and declared that states “have a right to, 
and should, promote sustainable development,” which links climate responsibility with develop-
ment goals. As binding emission reduction caps would restrict developing countries’ development 
objectives, this article did not only underline developed countries’ historic responsibility, but also 
indicated that developing countries have a right to increase their GHG emissions via industrializa-
tion that raises the living standards of the poor. Finally, the UNFCCC also affirmed the right to 
sovereignty as an important principle in climate politics (UN 1992). 
Although states in general agree that the distribution of responsibilities is a matter of 
fairness and that some of them have special responsibilities, there is a heated political dispute 
about the ethical underpinnings of how to define and distribute responsibilities in an equitable 
manner. Historically, special responsibilities have predominantly been attached to great pow-
ers, which have “fundamental global capabilities and responsibilities that minor or medium 
powers do not have” (Jackson 2000, 21). The UN Security Council has indeed addressed cli-
mate change several times but has failed to define climate change as an international security 
threat due to resistance from China and Russia. The UNFCCC defined states’ climate responsibil-
ity in accordance with the Rio principles 2 and 7. In other words, the UNFCCC underlined 
sovereignty and the CBDR principle. Both were prerequisites to reach an international agree-
ment with developing countries. CBDR acknowledged that developed (Annex I countries) and 
developing countries (non-Annex I countries) cannot be subjected to the same standards, but 
states’ responsibility has to be tied to their national circumstances and capacities. 
International negotiations over the special responsibilities of developed countries have 
been characterized by two tensions: The first is concerned with the scope of the emission 
reduction commitments of the U.S. and other industrialized countries. The second disputes 
how much (financial) assistance (to meet the costs of climate change) developed countries 
should provide to developing countries. Due to the refusal of the U.S. to accept a legally binding 
emission reduction target, the UNFCCC failed to set up quantitative emission reduction targets 
to any party. In accordance with the CBDR, it declared that developed countries must take the 
“lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” but it did not set any 
binding requirements for them (UN 1992). The Kyoto Protocol, however, operationalized the 
CBDR—whereas the UNFCCC encourages developed country parties to reduce emissions, 
the Kyoto Protocol commits them to doing so. Developed countries’ special responsibility to sup-
port developing countries’ capacities to meet climate change has also been a heated debate in 
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international politics for decades. The CBDR noted that developed countries have a special 
responsibility to assist developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. As this 
formulation did not describe the assistance as aid but as a responsibility, it made a “signifi-
cant step in the development of normative international relations,” based on the “fact that 
everyone, including developed countries, will benefit from such transfers which cannot there-
fore be regarded as charity” (Jackson 1996, 185–86). States have created diverse institutional 
arrangements to coordinate and implement developed countries’ special responsibility to assist 
developing countries’ climate policies and actions. For example, the UNFCCC established a 
Financial Mechanism to offer funds to developing countries, and the Adaptation Fund was 
established in 2001. 
Like environmental practices in general, climate responsibility is linked closely to the 
practices of economic growth. China and other developing countries played a central role in 
making economic development a key objective of climate responsibility. According to their 
Beijing Declaration in June 1991: 
Environmental problems cannot be dealt with separately; they must be linked to the 
development processes, bringing the environmental concerns in line with the imperatives 
of economic growth and development. In this context, the right to development for the 
developing countries must be fully recognized. (Quoted in Sachs 1993, 7)
Consequently, the Rio Declaration highlights the importance of development whenever 
possible, and the UNFCCC underlines sustainable development and the right developing 
countries have for development.
At the UNCED, China took a very reluctant attitude to international climate negotia-
tions. For it, the UNFCCC was a great diplomatic success—its stances on sovereignty, 
opposition to interference in internal affairs, the responsibility of developed countries, 
development rights, foreign aid, and technology transfer were incorporated within the 
convention. By participating in the UNFCCC, China fulfilled its responsibility to coop-
erate. In other words, the participation per se was China’s contribution. Furthermore, 
China refused to commit to any kind of emission reductions but demanded that developed 
countries must shoulder all the responsibility for climate change mitigation for historical 
reasons. As a non-annex state, China was not ordered to cut greenhouse gas emissions under 
the UNFCCC, but it was obligated to prepare national inventories of greenhouse gas emis-
sions caused by human activities, to develop a national climate program to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change, and to conduct research on climate change. In 1992, the then Chinese 
Premier, Li Peng, ratified the UNFCCC. 
The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994. At the first Conference of Parties (COP) in Berlin 
in 1995, the parties agreed that developed countries should set quantified emission reduction targets 
within specified timeframes, such as 2005, 2010, and 2020, and that these commitments should 
be written into a protocol. The Berlin Mandate hence launched the negotiation process leading 
to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. Negotiations culminated in two issues: What kind 
of emission reductions should developed countries undertake? Whether and, if so, what kind of 
mechanisms should be established to help developed countries to achieve their emission reduc-
tion targets in a flexible manner (Bodansky 2001)? The Kyoto Protocol defines that each Annex 
I country should agree on a legally binding, specific, and differentiated emission reduction target. 
Only Australia, Norway, and Iceland obtained targets that allowed them to increase their emissions 
above 1990 levels, and other developed countries were asked to cut their emissions up to 8 percent. 
In accordance with the CBDR, no quantitative targets were included for developing countries. To 
facilitate and monitor emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol also established reporting and veri-
fication procedures, as well as three market-based mechanisms, Clean Development Management, 
emission trade, and joint implementation (so-called Kyoto mechanisms). 
The U.S. ratified the UNFCCC in 1992 and hence, at least in principle, accepted the 
CBDR principle. Then U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, but his 
66      |     KOPRA
successor President George W. Bush refused to ratify it. Bush (2001, 2002) found the protocol 
unfair, as it did not assign special responsibilities for major developing emitters, such as China 
and India. Naturally, the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto process diluted the scope of climate 
responsibility. Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 after its ratification 
by Russia in 2004. 
The Road to Paris and Beyond
The first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal was in 2005 and established 
an ad hoc working group to organize negotiations of the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol 
(2012–20). Then, in 2007, the Bali Conference raised high, perhaps over-optimistic, expec-
tations of the achievements of post-Kyoto climate negotiations. Notably, China and other 
developing countries committed to implementing nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs) of sustainable development supported and enabled by “measurable, reportable and veri-
fiable” (MRV) technology, financing, and capacity building. Although NAMAs were not legally 
binding emission reduction targets but voluntary national policies, this was an important step 
in the negotiation process, as it was becoming more and more clear that major developing 
countries had become major emitters and that without their participation, climate change miti-
gation would be difficult. Many developing countries submitted their NAMAs by 2012, and 
many of them indeed pledged to undertake actions comparable to, or even more ambitious 
than, those of developed countries (see, for example, Held, Roger, and Nag 2013).
At the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, however, China and other developing countries 
argued that MRV standards only be applied to internationally supported climate actions but not 
voluntary, independently financed national actions. China, in particular, emphasized its sov-
ereignty and declared that since its climate measures would not be supported internationally, 
they could not be externally reviewed (Bukovansky, Clark, Eckersley, Price, Reus-Smit, and 
Wheeler 2012, 149). China was pleased with the Copenhagen Accord, as it respected China’s 
sovereignty and short-term national interests. However, other states blamed China for being 
irresponsible and for blocking progress, because it opposed not only binding the emission 
reductions for developing countries but also reducing the global greenhouse gas emissions by 
50 percent by the middle of the century (Christoff 2010).
At the Durban Conference in 2011, the parties agreed to launch a new round of 
negotiations to compile a new climate treaty by 2015, to come in to force in 2020, and 
to include all the major emitters. The distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I was 
no longer mentioned, but the proactive climate policies of developing countries were 
considered increasingly important to tackling climate change. The EU also committed 
to the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Before Durban, the Chinese 
government determinedly refused to agree to any binding climate obligation and offered 
voluntary national objectives instead. Since the Durban Conference, however, China has 
taken a more constructive role in international climate negotiations. To some extent, the 
attitude change was driven by the desire to improve China’s seriously damaged interna-
tional image following the Copenhagen Conference. The government did not want to be 
viewed as the spoiler, because such an image would prevent the Chinese from expanding 
their businesses and political influence—both being important elements of the party-
state’s legitimacy on the domestic front. In addition, Chinese citizens started to complain 
more vociferously about air pollution and other environmental problems caused by eco-
nomic growth. The government was forced to take these worries more seriously, again 
for legitimacy reasons. Finally, we should not ignore the role of great power management 
yielding change in China’s attitude toward international climate politics. Sino-American 
climate cooperation was successful, and a shared understanding of the climate responsi-
bility of great powers began to evolve between the two countries in the early 2010s. This 
gradually changed China’s position vis-à-vis international climate negotiations (Kopra 2018). 
CHINA AND THE UN CLIMATE REGIME        |     67
The 2014 Lima Accord (COP20) asked all parties to develop their intended nationally 
determined contributions (INDC) well in advance of the COP21 in Paris. As a result, 187 
sovereign states submitted their INDC to the UNFCCC. Even some very poor and conflicted 
areas, such as Afghanistan, issued a national climate change plan, and all together the INDCs 
represented about 95 percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (see UNFCCC 2016). 
The very inclusive—nearly universal—participation of states indicated a fundamental para-
digm shift in climate responsibility. Although the CBDR was not abandoned, even developing 
countries were now required, and willing, to contribute to climate change mitigation. In other 
words, all states are now urged to “undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” to combat 
climate change (UNFCCC 2015). Again, the INDCs were not ambitious enough to limit the 
rise of global temperatures to 2°C. 
At COP21, in 2015, a new international climate agreement entitled the Paris Agree-
ment was adopted. China played a very influential role in the conference. Notably, the Paris 
Agreement decided to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels,” recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts 
of climate change. Although the goal of 1.5°C was appreciated, many analysts and NGOs did 
not deem it as realistic, since the agreement did not require measures ambitious enough to 
achieve it or the 2°C target. The COP21 also acknowledged the gap between states’ emissions 
reduction commitments and the emission reduction actions needed to achieve the goal. It obli-
gated states to submit an updated INDC by 2020 and, thereafter, every five years. It also asked 
the IPCC to produce a report in 2018 to describe a roadmap outlining how global temperature 
increase could be limited to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement 
declared that states “aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible 
. . . and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to 
achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of green-
house gases in the second half of this century” (Ibid.). This means that states pursue measures to 
achieve a carbon-neutral world.
Although the Paris Agreement does not distinguish between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries, it is guided by CBDR. It stated that developed countries “should continue taking 
the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.” Nevertheless, it 
created a common framework for all countries’ climate responsibilities. It noted that develop-
ing countries “should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move 
over time toward economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of differ-
ent national circumstances” (Ibid., emphasis added). Moreover, the Paris Agreement established 
a transparency framework with a common binding commitment for all states involved. Each 
state is required to submit a “national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases” and to provide information “necessary to track 
progress made in implementing and achieving” their nationally determined mitigation and 
adaptation goals. This required a compromise from China, which previously viewed reporting 
obligations as a violation of its sovereignty. In addition, developed countries had to report on the 
financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support they have provided to developing 
countries, and developing countries have to report on the support received, respectively (Ibid.). 
The Paris Agreement noted that developing countries need assistance to implement their 
national climate action plans and that the peak in their GHG emissions may be realized later 
than that in developed countries (Ibid.). China was a strong advocate of this formulation, 
together with the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and Like-Minded 
Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDC) (including Argentina, Bolivia, China, 
Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Malaysia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, 
and India), which all resist legally binding GHG emission reduction targets for developing 
countries. These groups see no subcategories between developed and developing countries, 
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because such categories would apparently impede their position in international climate nego-
tiations. Nevertheless, China no longer focuses exclusively on the historic responsibility of 
developed countries, since—in his speech to COP21—Xi Jinping (2015) called for all states 
to “assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes.”
The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change 
Impacts (Loss and Damage Mechanism) was established in 2013. After long and heated debates, 
Loss and Damage gained its own article in the Paris Agreement. In particular, the COP21 not only 
asked that the Loss and Damage Mechanism “establish a clearinghouse for risk transfer that serves 
as a repository for information on insurance and risk transfer” but also that it “develop recom-
mendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the 
adverse impacts of climate change.” The COP21 hence acknowledged a special responsibil-
ity that is especially critical to international justice: Developed countries have to help poor 
countries cope with, for example, flood damages because it is the right thing to do even 
if they themselves do not benefit from the assistance. Essentially, loss and damage assis-
tance is very different from mitigation and adaptation assistance, which also serves developed 
countries’ interests through, for example, global emission reduction and the creation of business 
opportunities. At the insistence of the U.S., however, the COP21 noted that the ratification of the 
agreement does not “involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC 
2015). For the time being, a no-harm principle constituted the most important rule in the context 
of climate change damage. It applies to all the states, but in accordance with the CBDR, it is 
largely recognized that developed countries have better capacities to prevent environmental harm 
(Voigt 2008, 17).
Despite some shortcomings, the Paris Agreement is widely applauded as a historic land-
mark of climate responsibility. Although it does not include quantitative, binding emission 
reduction targets for any state—nor does it level sanctions if states fail to implement their 
climate action plans—there are strong hopes that states will fulfill their climate action pledges. 
It seems that one of the biggest strengths of the Paris Agreement is that although it does 
not set a top-down obligation, states have committed to voluntary, domestically appropriated 
mitigation plans. In particular, this style appealed to China, which prefers moderate voluntary 
commitments over legal international obligations, as there is no risk of failure and losing face. 
In contrast, China can easily exceed global expectations and gain international respect in this 
way. The bottom-up approach attracted the nearly universal participation of states, because 
it demonstrates both a strong global concern for climate change and the determined political 
will to combat it. 
The Paris Agreement went into effect on 4 November 2016. Since it established an inter-
national framework of what parties were expected to do but did not specify how they should 
limit global temperature rise, the parties decided to negotiate and adopt a Paris rulebook by 
2018. Those negotiations suddenly became more complicated as Donald Trump, who has 
called climate change a Chinese hoax, was elected U.S. president. As Trump had repeatedly 
threatened to vitiate the U.S. climate policy, his election immediately raised China’s position 
as a new climate leader—whether or not it wanted this distinction or was ready for it (Kopra 
2018). In June 2017, Trump did indeed withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, which 
opened a whole new chapter in international climate politics. The Chinese government has 
explicitly described itself as taking a driving seat in international climate negotiations (Xi 
2017, 4). It remains unclear which direction China will lead the world: Toward more ambi-
tious actions to mitigate climate change or toward a deeper bifurcation between developed and 
developing countries that will not be helpful for achieving the ultimate goals of the UNFCCC. 
Climate Responsibility’s Potential for a New Standard of Civilization
According to Holsti (2004, 144–45), a practice becomes institutionalized when “most states 
most of the time is consistent with its rules,” “there is a reasonable consensus on the interpretation 
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of norms, rules, and rights,” and it has “some authority independent of the particular interests of 
particular states at a given time.” It seems that climate responsibility has now passed all three 
of these stages and now constitutes an institutionalized international practice. However, it is 
not clear whether it has proceeded to the stage of assimilation, where a new practice becomes 
the new normal and its rules become so widely accepted that they are taken for granted and 
embedded in other social practices. At the stage of assimilation, participants perceive the rules of 
practice to be legitimate and worthy of being obeyed. In the words of Hurd (1999, 387), when an 
“actor believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retri-
bution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but instead by an internal sense of moral obligation: 
control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as ‘right.’” Although it is not 
crystal clear that climate responsibility has proceeded to this stage, this section investigates the 
potential of climate responsibility to achieve a status of a standard of civilization in the future. 
By 1905, the standard of civilization emerged as a practice that was used by many societ-
ies, both Western and non-Western, to differentiate between the civilized and non-civilized or 
barbarian (see Gong 1984; Buzan 2014b). The differentiation was made by quite racist rank-
ings, and the rules of practice defined what kind of requirements states must meet in order to 
become accepted, or civilized, members of international society. As the international society 
of that time was very European, the standard of civilization was firmly rooted in European 
norms and values, especially Christianity. After World War II, “the right of independence and 
sovereign equality” became fundamental international principles, and requirements for states’ 
entry to international society were abolished (Buzan 2014b, 585). Although the standard of 
civilization was no longer used as an explicit legal idea after decolonialization, the practice 
did not disappear. Today, it continues to live on in practices of international law. As David 
Fidler (2001) pointed out, states and international organizations promote universal ideas such 
as human rights, rule of law, and good governance in order to “impose liberal, globalized 
civilization on the world.” Yet, it can be argued that human rights is a (Western) practice that 
started to evolve after the horrors of World War II and has now somewhat achieved the status 
of a new standard of civilization. 
Despite its Western origin, the concept of a standard of civilization could provide food for 
thought to environmental ethics. I believe that climate responsibility has great potential to become 
a new standard of civilization. This is not, however, an entirely novel idea. The possession of an 
environmental policy already became a status symbol during the years preceding the Stockholm 
Conference. It became a piece of “evidence that a nation belonged among the more advanced 
or advancing states of the world and not among the backward nations” (Caldwell 1990, 46, 49). 
Today, environmental protection is a routine aspect of any civilized state’s practices, without a 
doubt. Though it is also now clear that climate change is happening, it has not yet caused sig-
nificant changes in states’ practices or the general public’s life. In contrast to previous standards 
of civilization, such as human rights and democracy, climate responsibility is not a Western 
concept. Climate practices are a pragmatic attempt to respond to a physical problem pointed 
out by the natural sciences, and it is not about a colonial pursuit to expand Western (philosophical) 
practices. This does not mean the evolution of climate practices would not include the use of power, 
at least in discursive means. In contrast to the traditional West-rest framing of the concept, how-
ever, climate responsibility does not aim to spread racist views or Western ideas but to construct 
a genuinely global standard of conduct. Though there is a wide north-south gap, the placing of 
blame is the reverse of previous standards of civilizations. In climate responsibility, it is usually 
non-Western states attempting to advance principles and ask industrialized countries to shoulder 
their responsibility. Hence, it is more or less the developed countries seen as failing to live up to the 
standard of civilization in the sense of climate responsibility. 
For China, this is obviously a desirable development. For years, it had been criticized for 
being an irresponsible member of international society, because it did not conform to the new 
standard of civilization. This criticism prevented it from taking its place as a full member of the 
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great power club and caused international suspicion and fears about its rising status (Suzuki 2008). 
At present, however, China is increasingly in a position to define what it means to be a responsible 
great power in today’s world. Clearly, it is not reasonable to assume that China will promote human 
rights and democracy as the new standard of civilization or attributes of great power responsibility. 
As climate responsibility does not collide with China’s national interests, it is a plausible candidate 
for a new standard of civilization in a China-led international society. 
Conclusions and Discussion
In this article, I demonstrated that climate responsibility fulfills all three requirements of 
Schatzki’s (1996, 98–110) integrative practice: 1) There is a practical understanding of the 
causes and effects of climate change, and, at least to some extent, a shared understanding of 
how to identify those who bear the biggest responsibility to take the required actions against 
climate change and what would count as a responsible response to climate change. 2) There 
are collectively agreed-upon rules on how states should distribute and act out climate responsi-
bilities, and some of these rules are formalized in international (soft) law. 3) It has a teleoaffective 
structure—it is a goal-oriented practice holding its “ends, purposes, projects, and tasks” to avoid 
the adverse effects of climate change. Climate change mitigation (and reporting on material-
ized climate actions) is now perceived as a general responsibility held by all states. Hence, 
climate responsibility is evidently an established international practice, which even the most 
powerful states must take part in if they wish to be and to be seen as good international citi-
zens. That is why all the participants have continued to take part in the negotiations even if 
they did not accept or later withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. None of the participants have 
simply walked away from the UN climate negotiations, despite the widespread discord and pointed 
criticism of each other’s contributions. The fact that the UNFCCC was negotiated very quickly, 
in about two years, indicates two points: On the one hand, it demonstrates universal concern over 
and willingness to tackle climate change. On the other hand, it illustrates that the UNFCCC 
was not seen as a powerful institution that would somehow hamper states’ national interests. 
In this sense, it is not a big surprise that while the UNFCCC enjoys the near universal par-
ticipation of international society, later international negotiations on the Kyoto protocol—and 
especially on the post-Kyoto protocol—were much more difficult and slower processes. As the 
negotiations aimed to set up legally binding emission reduction targets for individual states, 
they challenged the established institutions of international society and put states’ sovereignty 
and national interests at risk. At the same time, the difficulties of the post-Kyoto negotiations 
prove that UNFCCC has gained and is likely to gain more strength in the future. If it was an 
unimportant and weak practice, why would it be so contested? 
As the emergence of climate responsibility indicates a profound normative change in interna-
tional society, it invites a question: Can climate responsibility be identified as a primary institution 
of international society? In the light of this paper, climate responsibility indeed seems to fulfill 
the qualifications of a primary institution as defined by Friedner Parrat (2014): It is a truly 
international, routinized practice with norms and rules. It is consciously upheld and endorsed 
by a critical mass of states. And it has remained quite stable over time. It is also embodied in 
and shapes many global and domestic practices simultaneously. Clearly, climate responsibility 
remains only an emerging primary institution, as there are still wide disputes about its rules 
and it clashes with established institutions. It has not managed to construct a thick international 
society, and many central issues, such as finance and compensation, remain unsolved (see also 
Palmujoki 2013). From the ES perspective, however, the disputes do not make it weaker, but 
indicate that climate responsibility is gradually becoming a weightier international practice. 
Another critical question is whether or not climate responsibility will develop as a 
standard of civilization that defines and validates the practices of civilized members of 
international society as well as of world society in the future. Unfortunately, as James 
Speth (2008, 211) noted, the “surest path to widespread cultural change is a cataclysmic 
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event that profoundly affects shared values and delegitimizes the status quo and existing 
leadership.” A fundamental paradigm shift creating the new ecological consciousness and 
solidarist morals in international society would hence require a disastrous and abrupt 
climate crisis, as pictured by a Hollywood movie entitled the Day After Tomorrow. On 
the one hand, the securitization of climate change is not necessarily a desirable trend, as 
it could lead to a more pluralist international society in which more powerful states could 
use environmental threats as an excuse to interfere in other states’ internal affairs. On the 
other hand, securitization could promote a global we-feeling among political leaders and 
citizens and gives impetus to global efforts against climate change. If, or when, climate 
crisis becomes more tangible, and its adverse effects harm people (and nature) around 
the world, it would not be very difficult to imagine that those who reduce their emissions 
would be seen as civilized and that those who continue polluting in the business-as-usual 
style would be seen as uncivilized, respectively (see also Buzan 2014b, 590–91). If cli-
mate responsibility acquires a higher normative standing in the world, practices of other 
international organizations are likely to change as well. For example, the mandate of the 
UN Security Council could be redefined.
Due to the state-centric features of international society, state agency and that of great 
powers is an essential force of change in international society. Therefore, the leadership of 
China and the U.S. will be especially crucial in building the political will needed to strengthen 
climate responsibility. For a long time, China’s conception of climate responsibility was ret-
rospective. It focused exclusively on examining historic responsibility. This view naturally 
emphasized the historic responsibility of developed countries and assigned less—and even 
no—responsibility to developing countries, including China. Compared to its standpoints at 
the UNCHE and the UNCED, China’s role within contemporary international climate politics 
has changed radically. After the Copenhagen Conference, China learned that it is in its inter-
est to respond to climate change and that taking on a more constructive role in international 
climate negotiations might improve its damaged international image. In particular, severe air 
pollution has started to cause increasing social discontent in China, and in order to legitimize 
its position, the Chinese government has had no choice but to take climate change seriously. 
Moreover, Sino-American climate cooperation provided China with a chance to represent itself 
as a great power on the international stage. In particular, Barack Obama’s climate diplomacy 
convinced China that great powers have great responsibilities in addressing the problems related 
to climate change. As a result, China has begun to advocate climate responsibility as an attribute of 
a great power’s responsibility (Kopra 2018). Again, Donald Trump’s harshly criticized decision to 
withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement has had the effect of raising China to a new kind 
of leadership role in international climate politics. This transformation is likely to elevate China’s 
role in other fields of international society as well. Although China continues to underline its devel-
oping country status and holds fast to the CBDR principle, the country increasingly defines itself 
as a great power in international climate negotiations. It has great potential for acting as a role 
model when it comes to climate responsibility if it manages to modernize without recklessly 
increasing GHG emissions. In any event, China plays an increasingly important role in the 
potential evolution of climate responsibility as a standard of civilization. 
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